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ABSTRACT 
 
The role of trust in economic exchange is ill-defined. Trust between alliance partners is argued to 
sometimes be an alternative to costly governance mechanisms and can therefore lead to superior 
performance. On the other hand, relying on anything but investments to secure credible commitment 
to deterrence is described as myopic. This paper explores a middle ground where, in the context of a 
reputation network, governance costs can decline without the strict necessity of intentional trust. 
Using an experimental approach, we show that reputation effects lead to significant advantages for 
reliable players in terms of offers to ally and the quality of those offers. These advantages resulted 
in lower governance costs and better performance 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ccurately predicting how others will act in economic exchange would be a very valuable ability 
indeed. With it, economic actors could choose the right partners, avoid investment in costly 
governance mechanisms to prevent defection and loss, and increase their own returns.  Trust is such a 
prediction: scholars investigating it argue that intentional trust develops between partners as a result of the familiarity 
that arises from repeated transactions (Gulati 1995a; Gulati and Singh 1998; Nooteboom et al. 1997) or because 
partners are aware that to act otherwise is counter to a organizational or personal values and standards (Barney and 
Hansen 1994). In these cases, exchange partners can deliberately elect not to invest in governance because they can 
reasonably rely on the other not to take advantage of that vulnerability. Exchanges between mutually trustworthy 
partners can lead to higher returns. 
 
Conversely, Williamson (1993a, p 469) argues that “trust is irrelevant to economic exchange” because of the 
joint effects of bounded rationality and the threat of opportunistic behavior in others. Since we cannot absolutely 
determine, ex ante, the reliability of a potential partner, exchange conditions such as complexity, uncertainty or asset 
specificity warrant that we invest in governance to protect our positions.  Our trust here is situational in that we do not 
rely on the other’s good will but only in their economic self-interest because the cost of defection is too high. In this 
view, there is no opportunity to reduce the costs of governance.    
 
In this paper, we explore a space between these perspectives. In the context of a series of exchanges which 
creates a reputation network, we argue that farsighted agents will recognize that reliable, cooperative behavior is in 
their own economic self-interest and can lead to superior performance. If an agent can be predicted to cooperate in an 
exchange, then partners can reduce their own costs of governance. Reliable actors should be preferred partners and 
therefore enjoy more exchange opportunities. Second, among this larger group of offers, reliable actors should also 
find higher quality offers, that is, more reliable potential partners and thereby be able to choose better partners. 
Ultimately, reliable firms should be able to conduct their own transactions with comparatively lower governance 
costs, leading to a performance advantage.  
 
A 
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This approach differs from the contrast between intentional and situational trust we drew above in the 
following ways. First, our notion of reliability in this paper is not as constraining as intentional or strong-form trust: 
we argue that self-interest is a sufficient bond. Put differently, actors do not have to have deep or strong trust in 
prospective partners, but only the belief that the other will act in her own interest. Second, the opportunity cost of lost 
or inferior future transactions will act as a sufficient governance mechanism. The value of reputation discourages 
defection (Kreps 1990a) and permits some actors to enter exchanges without the usual governance expenditures.  We 
characterize the exchanges in our paper as alliances because the actors are autonomous and the transactions exhibit 
asset specificity, creating the risk of opportunistic behavior (Williamson 2002). 
 
A fundamental problem in investigating propositions like these empirically is that the data are difficult to 
secure. Most empirical work in trust and alliances concerns alliances that have actually existed rather than with the 
possibilities of alliance (Gulati 1995a, 1995b; Gulati and Singh 1998; Parkhe 1993; Reuer and Arino 2002).  Reuer 
and Arino (2002) do inquire into the pool of potential alliance partners a firm has but this is self-reported assessment 
by the focal firms and may not reflect the perspective of the potential partners.  Moreover, determining the reputation 
of a firm is extremely difficult (de Castro et al. 2006; Deephouse 2000). Therefore, following Olk and Elvira (2001), 
Knez and Camerer (1994), and Dollinger, et al (1997), among many others, we developed an experimental study using 
MBA students to determine if the reputations players develop matter in terms of numbers and quality of offers, as well 
as the ultimate performance of those players. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The objective of transaction analysis is to minimize the combined costs of opportunism and governance 
through discriminating alignment or the match of transaction and governance form (Williamson 1991). From a 
transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective, alliances are an intermediate form of governance, preserving market 
like incentives but also entailing bilateral dependency between parties.  In market based transactions, clear and 
complete contracts ex ante and unambiguous contractual performance are the rule (Ring and Van de Ven 1992) and 
the identity of the partners is not important nor are the parties to the exchange dependent on the other. Transactions 
are comparatively well defined and subject to the constraints of contract law. Alliances differ from spot transactions in 
that while the parties remain independent, specific investments made to further the alliance create dependencies and 
are subject to compromise by partners because the contracts that define the alliance and the rights to the rents from 
those investments are more complex than spot contracts and incomplete.  Exchange partners are bilaterally dependent 
to the extent they cannot easily or economically resort to a “next-best” use for the assets dedicated to the exchange  
(Williamson 2002) which generates the opportunity for gains through hierarchical control (Williamson 1991). 
Specifically, Williamson (1975) argues that when transactions are attended by uncertainty, recur frequently, and assets 
have been made specific to the transaction, hierarchical control is indicated.   
 
Bounded rationality renders complex contracts incomplete and parties to the exchange can exploit contractual 
gaps through strategic or opportunistic behavior. Williamson argues opportunism “engages the realpolitiks of 
economic organization” (Williamson 1993b, p 98) because human actors are self-interested and “will not 
reliably…self-fulfill all promises. Contract as mere promise, unsupported by credible commitments, will not, 
therefore, be self-enforcing” (Williamson 1999, p 1089).  Although some argue that TCE assumes all actors are 
opportunistic (e.g., Ring and Van de Ven, 1992), it is not necessary that parties to the exchange believe that the other 
will act opportunistically, only that uncertainty about the other’s intentions makes the creation of governance in the 
presence of bilateral dependency prudent (Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Williamson 1993b).  In consequence, private 
ordering or more hierarchical governance emerges when the parties are foresighted enough to recognize potential 
hazards and devise mechanisms to mitigate those hazards such as dispute settlement through bureaucracy, arbitration 
and information disclosure. Governance efficacy is thus determined both by private ordering and by the institutional 
mechanisms such as the laws of property and contract and the courts (Williamson 1991).  
 
Under some conditions, trust between partners is argued to substitute for costlier forms of governance in 
alliances. Scholars distinguish between several forms of trust. There is first the expectation or reliance of performance 
that stems from well structured governance mechanisms (variously termed “calculative” (Williamson 1993a), “semi-
strong form” (Barney and Hansen 1994), “deterrence based” (Gulati 1995a), or “risk based” trust (Ring and Van de 
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Ven 1994)). Here, parties to an exchange anticipate that partners will not default because the mechanisms in place 
make it costly to do so. That is, behavior is situationally motivated (McCabe et al. 2003).  Because the reliability is a 
function of investments in governance, though, there is no opportunity to use trust to economize on transactions costs. 
A different type of trust (termed “intentional” (Nooteboom et al. 1997), “strong form” (Barney and Hansen 1994), 
“goodwill based” (Ring and Van de Ven 1994), or “behavioral” trust (Gulati 1995a)) is based on beliefs about 
intrinsic characteristics of the partner such as values and principles. In this case, trust emerges as an assessment of the 
intentional state of the other (McCabe et al. 2003).     
 
An example of how intentional trust is argued to reduce transaction costs comes from work showing that 
direct (i.e., dyadic) trust is built as firms repeatedly interact (Gulati 1995a, 1995b; Gulati and Singh 1998). As the 
number of prior alliances increases, the likelihood of the governance of a subsequent alliance being equity based (with 
equity as the deterring investment) decreases.  As the result of repeated experience or habitualization, the subjective 
assessment of the  probability of loss decreases (Nooteboom et al. 1997). Parkhe (1993) also finds empirical support 
for the link between experience and a decrease in the perception of opportunistic behavior.   
 
We argue that, absent other information, this argument reflects unwarrantedly optimistic posterior reasoning. 
Suppose that A and B have engaged a series of exchanges marked by at-risk rents and corresponding investments in 
governance mechanisms. A observes that B has behaved properly in all transactions and now considers how to govern 
the next exchange. If the repeated interactions argument is correct, A should be inclined to regard B as trustworthy 
and forego governance investments. However, A cannot determine if the reason B cooperated was because of the 
governance mechanisms or because B is inherently trustworthy: A has absolutely no new information about B’s 
trustworthiness and the new governance decision is precisely the same as the decision faced in the first exchange. A 
might correctly believe that B is trustworthy but the history of transactions provides no evidence to support that belief. 
Thus, Williamson argues “that the study of economic organization is better served by treating commercial transactions 
without reference to trust” (Williamson 1993b, p 99). As a reflection of this, contra Gulati, recent empirical work 
suggests that even after repeated ties, firms elect to maintain governance investments if the asset specificity is high 
(Casciaro 2003; Reuer and Arino 2002). 
 
Nonetheless, the idea of reducing the subjective assessment of opportunism is not extinguished. Although the 
threat of opportunism is often taken as given, Williamson observes that hazards of exchange vary with both the nature 
of the transaction and with the trading environment (Williamson 1993a). Specifically, Williamson regards the 
institutional environment as a set of shift parameters and as these change or differ, the comparative costs of the 
governance choices change. For example, social culture can inhibit or encourage opportunistic behavior through 
variations in structures such as courts or property law. At a more informal level, professionalism and networks can 
moderate the governance choices.  
 
To illustrate, Williamson analyzes the way transactions are conducted on the diamond bourse in New York 
where binding agreements for diamond purchases are made on the basis of a handshake and uttering the phrase mazel 
u’broche (Bernstein 1992). Williamson disputes that the transactions are (intentionally) trust based. Rather, the 
informality is possible because the community of traders was able to develop sanctions internally that dealt with 
default or deceit. Traders in the Diamond Club agree to submit all disputes arising from trade to one of two dispute 
resolution bodies where resolution is based on trade custom and usage (often published in the Clubs bylaws). 
Punishments for default range from the financial to suspension or expulsion from the Club so the bourse acts as 
reputation signaling and monitoring mechanism (Bernstein 1992). Williamson argues that the establishment of these 
network based trading rules provides safeguards (sanctions) that reduce the need for transaction specific governance 
investments. 
 
We extend this idea to argue that when reputation exists, reputation matters and the sanctions need not be 
imposed by communal act or collective agreement. Rather, in networks where information about reputation is 
available, sanction can emerge in a market-like way from the decisions of self-interested actors about with whom to 
transact and thereby generate the opportunity for reduced governance costs. More specifically, as parties develop 
reputations for how they conduct transactions, others will use those reputations to decide if and how to engage in 
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exchange (Kreps 1990a). In this way it differs from the “absent other information” problem of exchange governance 
in direct trust situations.  
 
Reputation is a belief or signal about the true type of a potential partner (Weigelt and Camerer 1988) that 
stems from observation of past actions and permits prediction of future action (Parkhe 1993). Economic actors can 
build a reputation for trustworthy behavior much as they can in the repeated ties framework: through consistent, 
cooperative performance in a context (such as a network) where such performance is noted.  Similarly, actors can lose 
status through default on a transaction. Just as default on the diamond bourse becomes well known to the community 
and the transgressor’s reputation is degraded (as Bernstein (1993, p 129) notes, an expelled trader not only no longer 
has the right to trade on the New York bourse but “his name is circulated to all the bourses in the world federation and 
posted on their bulletin boards”) unreliable actors in a reputation network can suffer through reduced opportunity as 
other parties learn of transgressions and deem the defaulting actor less appropriate as a partner.  
 
Under these conditions, foresighted actors should be disposed to act cooperatively. We note that it doesn’t 
matter if the motivation for trustworthy behavior is situational or intentional: the effect is the same in terms of 
building a reputation. Therefore, to avoid confusion about which type of trust might be meant, we will refer to 
consistent, cooperative behavior as “reliable”.  In either event, partners of such actors could rely on the institutional 
structure to defray governance costs since they can be confident the partner will not act opportunistically and reliable 
actors should be preferred partners. Put differently, if reputations for reliability and trustworthiness permit actors to 
discriminate among potential partners, they should rationally prefer to ally with those that will allow them to reduce 
their own costs of governance.  In a set of actors with differing reputations, then, reliable actors should be preferred 
partners and therefore entertain more opportunities to ally than the less reliable. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Reliable actors will receive more offers to ally than less reliable actors. 
 
Aside from a greater quantity of offers, the quality of offers the actors receive should differ and reliable 
actors should receive offers from more reliable potential partners. Firms that have achieved a high industry or network 
standing are not often motivated to ally with lower rated firms because such affiliation can erode status. Thus, these 
firms will practice exclusivity, preferring to ally with organizations of similar status (Benjamin and Podolny 1999; 
Podolny 1994). Similarly, Nooteboom, et al, (1997) include among the mechanisms for controlling relational risk in 
alliances selecting only partners that share norms and values. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Reliable actors will receive offers of higher quality (i.e., relatively more offers from reliable potential 
partners). 
 
If reliable actors have a better choice set, they are differentially able to choose partners that are also reliable  
and subsequently choose to reduce their own governance costs (Benjamin and Podolny 1999; Hill 1990). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Reliable actors will be more likely to choose and partner with other trustworthy actors. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Reliable actors will be able to economize on own costs of governance.   
 
Therefore, because reliable actors can choose better partners and avoid governance costs others may have to 
incur, we expect that they should have better performance.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Reliable actors will have higher returns from their choices. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
To study the effects of reputation on how transaction opportunities are generated and governed, we 
developed an experimental approach. Trustworthiness or the reputation for it is a difficult attribute to capture as 
reputation typically includes many components (Cravens et al. 2003) but an experiment allowed us to constrain 
reputation to a single indicator (a participant’s history of cooperation) and control for other hidden or systemic 
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influences. We designed a Web based game that gave participants the opportunity to make and accept arms-length 
offers for alliance with other players and to choose how to manage the transaction. Economics experiments like ours 
have elsewhere been used to assess cooperative behavior (Knez and Camerer 1994; Shamdasani and Sheth 1995; 
Weber et al. 2001) and many use MBA students as subjects (Flynn et al. 2001; Langfred 2004; Leatherwood and 
Conlon 1987; Priem and Rosenstein 2000). Though experiments like these may only be “simple laboratory creations”, 
they do model how more complex processes might work in the world (Knez and Camerer 1994, p 108). 
 
The participants in our study were 114 MBA students enrolled in strategy, human resource management and 
business ethics classes at an eastern U.S. university. Participation was voluntary and all who participated in at least 
75% of the rounds were awarded class credit. Six players dropped out of the game, leaving 108 participants. Of these, 
26% were full-time students and 74% were part-time students employed full-time in professional positions. Sixty-one 
percent of the participants were male, 39% female and the average age was 29 years. 
 
The idea of our game was to generate competition for alliance partners and to assess the role that reputation 
had on that competition. Our approach tracked the choices players made about which partners to work with and how 
to manage those transactions when information about the partners was limited to a simple measure of that partner’s 
past decisions. Overall, players competed to maximize alliance points won over the course of the game (with an 
incentive of a $75 restaurant certificate)  but the first objective of the game was to enter single round alliances with 
another player and split contracts worth 500 points in total. The way the points were allocated to each player depended 
on the joint strategies chosen in that transaction.   
 
Our game was designed as a version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) but, unlike an iterated game where 
players develop a history with each other (and a tacit judgment of reliability), players in this game had no guarantee of 
repeated interactions. To establish reputations, we provided information about the strategies potential partners had 
employed in the past. For each player, we posted a score that captured the number of times in the past five transactions 
the participant had played “cooperate”. For example, a player that had cooperated four out the last five transactions 
would have a reputation score of 4. Players could learn more about potential partners by purchasing additional history 
at 10 points per five prior transactions (though this option was used in less than .9% of the offers and is excluded from 
our analysis). We did not show the strategies players had selected for any contracts that were not consummated. 
Because history about others was available to the players, PD games like this have been described as coordination 
games where the interest is in if players “trust others to choose the high payoff actions” (Knez and Camerer 1994, p 
107).  
 
As in any version of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, players could choose to cooperate or defect, with varying 
payoffs. As Hill (1990) observes, games of this sort generate high asset specificity in the choice of partners. Since 
there is value only in consummating a transaction and there is no recourse to other potential partners in case of 
defection in that round (constituting a form of temporal asset specificity (Williamson 1991)), the composite rents are 
completely at risk and should demand governance.  In alliances, firms can protect themselves when asset specificity is 
high by investing in governance such as bonding or monitoring to prevent losses due to opportunistic behavior by 
partners but these costs dissipate the rents that should accrue to the transaction (Hill 1990). Our game proxied these 
governance costs by offering the opportunity for players to purchase insurance at a cost of 50 points per purchase 
against the chance of defection by a potential partner, so this became a four strategy version of the PD.  The insurance 
put players in the same position that effective governance would, i.e., made whole less the costs of governance. That 
is, insurance blocked loss due to defection. Insured players whose partner did not defect still bore the cost of 
purchasing protection.  In our game, the Defect/Insure and Defect/No insurance are weakly dominant versus their 
parallel Cooperate strategies, which suggests that utility maximizing players will strictly prefer a Defect strategy 
(Kreps 1990b). Between the two defect strategies, Defect/Insure is the equilibrium solution so, overall, we should 
expect players to converge to a Defect/Insure strategy. Table 1 shows the payoffs for each strategy combination. 
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Table 1: Game Payoff Matrix 
 
Player 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Player 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participants were introduced to the game in presentations in each class as well as e-mailings with game 
instructions and rules which are shown in Appendix 1.  Beyond publishing these rules, we did not train or advise the 
players on how to select strategies. In particular, we did not give any further information about insuring transactions 
so the players were left to their own devices to construct decision rules for when and if they would insure an alliance 
transaction. Players registered for the game online and selected a “game name” (drawn from noun lists for birds, trees, 
plants, etc,) intended to preserve anonymity and to prevent real world reputations and side negotiations from skewing 
alliance decisions. As Granovetter (1985) notes, PD type choices are often obviated by personal relations outside the 
game. Therefore, we wanted to restrict private information as much as possible to focus the choice mechanism on our 
single reputation measure. To that end, each player signed a pre-game agreement agreeing that security was important 
and that players would not divulge their game names to other students. Post-game interviews indicate that the players 
did maintain anonymity.  The game was developed by the authors and placed on a university server (see www/…). 
The design of this game is consistent with Knez and Camerer’s (1994) observation that economic experiments should 
address purpose, context, and incentives. That is, the purpose of this game is to operationalize reputation effects in a 
player directed context with both a participation and outcome incentive.   
 
PROCEDURE  
 
Rounds in the game were played twice per week over the course of a semester with each round run in real 
time over a two day period. At the outset, we announced that the game would consist of 15 to 24 rounds, the actual 
number only announced at the outset of the last (twentieth) round. At the beginning of each round, 70% of the players 
(Contractors) were randomly selected based on a uniform distribution to own contracts or the right to choose an 
alliance Partner. This was intended to assure that not all players would score in each round. The complete list of 
Contractors was published on the game website. All players, Contractors or not, could sign in to the game and make 
offers (that is, offer to be a partner) to up to four Contractors. Contractors could not make offers to themselves. When 
each player made an offer to ally, he or she had to choose a strategy at that time. That strategy, to cooperate or defect, 
with or without insurance, was hidden from the Contractor until after an alliance offer was accepted. This, in effect, 
turned sequential decisions into simultaneous ones.   
 
Later in the round, Contractors would sign on again, choose a Partner from the list of offers, and select a 
strategy for the transaction with no idea what strategy the Partner was playing.  There was no limit to the number of 
offers a Contractor could receive but if there were none, the Contractor could not score in that round. Once an offer 
was accepted, the Contractor could accept no more offers nor could the Partner be selected as a partner by another 
Contractor in that round.  The results for each consummated transaction were available to the Contractor and Partner 
immediately and after each round, we published an ordered list of players and their total scores on the website so all 
participants knew their relative position.  
 
 
 
 
 Coop/ No 
Insurance 
Coop/  
Insurance 
Defect/ No 
Insurance 
Defect/  
Insurance 
Coop/ No 
Insurance 
250 
250 
200 
250 
500 
0 
450 
0 
Coop/   
Insurance 
250 
200 
200 
200 
250 
200 
200 
200 
Defect/ No 
Insurance 
0 
500 
200 
250 
250 
250 
450 
0 
Defect/ 
Insurance 
0 
450 
200 
200 
0 
450 
200 
200 
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MEASURES 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
We tested hypotheses for five dependent variables.  The first dependent variable was the sum of offers (total 
offers) made to a Contractor in a given round.  The second was a measure of the general reputation score of the 
potential Partners, which we constructed as the mean of reputation scores (mean partner reputation) for all the offers a 
Contractor received in a particular round. The third variable was a dichotomous assessment of if Contractors chose 
partners of the same strategic type (strategy match) in a given round.  The fourth dependent variable measured the 
extent to which players economized on governance costs by dichotomously assessing if insurance was purchased 
(insurance).   Our fifth dependent variable was a continuous measure of how a specific Contractor score varied from 
the average Contractor score for that round (contractor score). Our data consisted of 7,442 offers to Contractors in 
1,445 contracts and of these, 1041 resulted in consummated alliances. We excluded data from the first two rounds as 
reputations were just being developed. With respect to the last three dependent variables, we also excluded the results 
of the decision from the last round to exclude backward induction problems  (Hill 1990; Kreps 1990b).  
 
Independent Variable 
 
Because we were able to successfully insist on player anonymity and because the names were not indicative 
of personal characteristics or hints to the player’s real identity, we are able to work with a single independent variable: 
reputation score. To account for the substantial number of choices made in the early rounds when players had not yet 
accumulated five transactions, we coded the reputation scores into four categories. Players that in their published 
history had always cooperated were coded AC. Players who cooperated half the time or more (but not always) were 
coded UC (usually cooperated). Players who had played pure defect strategies were coded always defected (AD) and 
players who usually defected (defected in more than half of the prior five transactions but not always) were coded UD. 
This allowed us to structure the reputation score as a categorical variable. 
 
Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 address choice or the result of choice for Contractors so for these we include control 
variables addressing player sex, age, and full-time versus part-time status.  We employed several techniques to 
analyze our data. Our first, second, and fifth dependent variables are continuous, we chose an OLS approach for those 
DVs. The strategy match and insurance variable are dichotomous and evaluated in logit regressions.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive statistics for the strategies, offers, and alliances per round are shown in Table 2. The results of 
the regressions are shown in Table 3. All regressions were run with the Always Cooperate strategy as the omitted 
category so the results are expressed relative to that strategy and all models are significant at p>.01. With respect to 
the total number of offers each strategy attracted, the analysis shows that the coefficients for the three other strategies 
are negatively signed and significant at the p<.01  level. Relative to the AC strategy, any other strategy appears to 
result in fewer offers, supporting H1. With respect to the quality of the offers, the results indicate that the three other 
strategies generate offers from less reliable potential partners. Again, all coefficients are negatively signed and 
significant at the p<.01 level, supporting H2. The logit regression for H3 indicates that players other than AC players 
were much less likely to choose partners of an equivalent strategic type, supporting the hypothesis with coefficients 
negative significant at p<.01.  The results for H4 indicate that relative to other strategies, players using the AC 
strategy are less likely to purchase insurance, thereby reducing their governance costs. The coefficients are positive 
and significant at the p<.01 level. We also note that this is the only decision where a control variable is significant: 
part-time students were less likely to purchase insurance.  Finally, the analysis of contractor score for H5 indicates 
that relative to AC players, contractor scores for other strategies were lower. Coefficients were negatively signed and 
significant at p<.01.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean St. Dev 
AD/round 16.7 5.3 
UD/round 32.4 10.5 
UC/round 35.8 10.2 
AC/round 20.8 5.5 
Offers/round 369.9 35.2 
Alliances/round 57.9 10.3 
Mean reputation/round 1.5 0.2 
Insurance/round 31.4 6.3 
Contractor score/round 209.1 11.7 
 
 
Table 3: Regression Results Relative To Strategy AC (Always Cooperate) 
 
 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 
DV Total offers Mean reputation Strategy match Insurance Contractor score 
Strategy      
Always Defect -6.58 
(0.44)** 
-0.73 
(0.06)** 
-2.26 
(0.25)** 
1.13 
(0.21)** 
-0.23 
(0.05)** 
Usually Defect -7.63 
(0.37)** 
-0.70 
(0.05)** 
-1.24 
(0.19)** 
1.15 
(0.18)** 
-0.21 
(0.04)** 
Usually 
Cooperate 
-6.11 
(0.36)** 
-0.48 
(0.05)** 
-1.15 
(0.18)** 
0.76 
(0.17)** 
-0.11 
(0.04)* 
Sex (F=1)   0.08 
(0.14) 
-0.14 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
Age   0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Status (FT=1)   0.18 
(0.17) 
-0.33 
(0.16) * 
-0.17 
(0.04) 
Constant 10.24 
(0.29) 
1.83 
(0.04) 
0.35 
(0.34) 
-0.98 
(0.34) 
1.11 
(0.08) 
N 1435 1435 1037 1037 1037 
F (3, 1431) 153.19 72.93   5.79 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000   0.0000 
   111.72 48.79  
   0.0000 0.0000  
R-squared 0.24 0.13   0.03 
Adj R-squared 0.24 0.13   0.03 
Pseudo-R^2   0.08 0.03  
†  p<.10 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this paper was to deconstruct the process by which actors with good reputations may derive 
benefit from that reputation in alliance transactions. We proposed that reliable actors get more and better opportunities 
to ally which permits them to select better partners and reduce own governance costs. This should result in better 
performance vis a vis other less reliable actors.  Using data derived from experiment based transactions, we find that 
our hypotheses are broadly supported and offer the following observations. 
 
 Our first results show that trustworthy players do receive more offers but the coefficients indicate the effect is 
not completely linear. Further analysis shows that players using a Usually Defect strategy were significantly less likely 
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to receive offers than any other strategy. It appears that being unreliable is less attractive than being completely (but 
reliably) untrustworthy. This is somewhat counterintuitive and has managerial implications. If reputation is an asset 
that is constructed over time and through interactions, the uncertainty that attends unreliable behavior could suggest a 
barrier to firms that would like to improve their own reputations. A lack of opportunities would make it more difficult 
to enter alliances even if the firm intends to cooperate, which supports Barney and Hansen’s (1994) position that it 
should be difficult and time consuming for firms to change the perception of their trustworthiness.  
 
 The analysis also supported Hypothesis 2 in that players using an AC strategy received significantly better 
offers measured as the mean reputation score for all offers received by players of a given strategy in a particular 
round. Further analysis indicates that this is a conservative result: Figure 1 shows that the difference in mean 
reputation scores, especially between AC and AD strategies, becomes more pronounced over time. We interpret this to 
reflect the way players developed and applied decision rules about potential partners. One obvious rule appears to be 
that AC players would offer to and accept from only other AC players. A less obvious rule for AD players emerged: 
even though AC partners are preferable, the application of the AC rule means that offers from AD players would 
rarely be accepted so that an offer to an AC player was a wasted offer.  
 
 
Figure 1: Mean Reputation Scores For Received Offers By Strategy By Round 
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Over time, several exchange subgroups emerged. As hypothesized in H3, AC players strongly preferred to 
choose AC partners and did not often “choose down”. This was true of UC players as well, though the effect is not as 
strong. UC player would prefer AC partners and sometimes had that opportunity, but the strength of the AC clustering 
means this was not commonly available. At lower reputation levels, the grouping weakens as players would strongly 
prefer to choose up so they become opportunists, choosing the best available.  As a complement to this analysis, we 
also assessed (but do not show here) the differences between players who consummated alliances and those that did 
not. On mean, players who neglected to consummate alliances had lower reputation scores than those who did, 
significant at p<.01.  Collectively, that AD type players are forced into lower value exchanges and, ultimately, are 
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more likely to drop out of the exchange process illustrate Hill’s (1991) claim: in the long run, firms that are habitually 
opportunistic should be driven from the market. While our study was brief and the game rules provided motivation for 
continued participation, the actual behavior of players facing poorer opportunities and probable lower results reflects 
Hill’s conjecture.  
 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 address the governance decisions and the ultimate effects of player choices. The results 
support the hypotheses but we note that the models are not highly explanatory. Our interpretation is that this is 
because outcomes reflect a sequence of related choices. To the extent that actors may not make optimal partner 
choices, then the subsequent effects including better performance will not be realized.  Our results also reflect the fact 
that some actors are myopic.  
 
Our approach used the interactions of MBA students to model transaction decisions and clearly, a limitation 
to our paper is that individuals are not firms. However, alliances are not developed between firms per se but rather 
between individuals in those firms. Reputations develop between organizations as a result of repeated interactions and 
friendship between individuals in those firms (Nooteboom et al. 1997; Olk and Elvira 2001; Ring and Van de Ven 
1992).  Thus, we argue, the judgments of managers like those we used in our experiment are often the foundation of 
interfirm transactions and can provide a guide to behavior at the firm level. To this end, we were encouraged to 
observe that in the only case where a control variable for the choice hypotheses signified, we find that part time 
students (i.e., those already working)  were less likely to purchase insurance for their transactions, suggesting a deeper 
appreciation of the implications of reputation.   
 
Another limitation to interpreting the results of our study is the clarity of our reputation signal. Our 
reputation measure is unidimensional and objectively accurate but in the world, firm reputation is multidimensional, 
subjective, and noisy (Deephouse and Carter 2005; Dollinger et al. 1997; Lewellyn 2002). To the extent that 
reputation is a belief by others about the true nature of a person or firm, the data that are used to construct that belief 
can be more or less accurate. For example, at the most innocuous level, a manager might have an honest disagreement 
about the performance of a partner, which dissatisfaction may be wrongly interpreted by others.  Information might 
also be manipulated for strategic reasons, specifically, to mislead others about the reputation of a third (Williamson 
1975). In any event, if information like this is costly to develop, managers may under invest and leave themselves 
exposed to error.  
 
However, exchanges like these are not often conducted in an informational vacuum. When firms or 
employees belong to organizations such as an industry, trade organization, technological field or R&D venture, they 
are part of a more or less structured network. Informational resources develop through direct and indirect interactions 
that allow them to cost effectively profile or characterize other firms in the network with respect to attributes such as 
competences or reliability (Gulati 1999; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). The most accurate history comes from direct 
(relational) interactions with firms in the network (Gulati 1995a, 1995b; Podolny 1994) but indirect experience or 
referrals from trusted partners can expand the stock of reliable information (Gulati 1995b; Stuart 1998).    
 
Firms on the periphery or outside a network may not have the richness of relations that more central firms do, 
but even then, the structure of the network and positions of firms in that network can provide useful cues about 
reliability (Gulati 1998). Because central or high profile firms in a network have more ties with other firms and 
because these firms would prefer to partner with firms of equal or near equal status, affiliates can benefit from shared 
reputation (Benjamin and Podolny 1999; Stuart 1998), presenting a richer choice set for firms outside. This and the 
way our results illustrate Podolny’s (1994) notion of exchange exclusivity suggests that the problem for peripheral 
firms is not identifying good potential partners but developing legitimacy as a partner themselves.  
 
Finally, even though reputation is multidimensional, Dollinger et al, (1997) show that managers are able to 
distinguish between reputation elements and not make wholesale attributions even when one aspect of reputation is 
damaged. To the extent that managers can reach a judgment about a potential partner’s reliability, then, the general 
complexity of reputation shouldn’t diminish these results. 
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Our study used an experimental approach to assess how reputations for reliability in transactions affected the 
opportunities players enjoyed and the decisions they made. In general, our results show that developing a reputation 
for reliability pays off in that such players receive more and better offers and are subsequently able to leverage these 
opportunities into better performance. The basis for choice was not trust in the richest intentional sense but simpler 
reliance on economic self-interest. These results illustrate Williamson’s (1993a) claim that reputation effects can be 
included in the efficient exchange.  To the extent that the participants are also managers, these results could be 
reflected in the real world in preferences for and decisions about alliance partners.   
 
APPENDIX 
 
The Alliance Game – How To Play 
 
The objective of the Alliance Game is to score the most points by entering into and managing alliances. 
There are two ways you can enter an alliance: you can accept an offer to ally with someone else or have an offer 
accepted by another player. Alliances involve contracts or opportunities to work together. In each round, most (but 
not all) players will own the rights to a contract and can accept offers from other players. In order to score points, the 
contract holder must accept an offer from one player among those who make offers. Also, in each round, all players 
will have the chance to see who has contracts available and make offers to them. You score points as here only if your 
offer is accepted.  
 
1. A contract is worth 500 points in total.  
2. In each round, every player can examine who the contract-holders are and make offers to up to four of them 
(so choose wisely). You can have only one offer accepted, though, and as soon as one of your offers is 
accepted, the offers to other players are eliminated. 
3. In each round, most (but not all) of the players will be contract holders. Contract holders can examine any 
number of offers from other players and accept one to execute a contract. Once an offer is accepted, the 
alliance is complete. 
4. In each offer or acceptance, players must decide before accepting or making an offer how to manage the 
alliance. There are two positions a player can take: 
a. Cooperate in the contract. In this case, the player agrees to split the contract with the partner. 
b. Defect from the contract. In this case, the player is claiming the entire contract value.   
c. Examples: 
i. If A and B both decide to cooperate, they each receive 250 points 
ii. If A cooperates and B defects, A receives 0 points and B receives 500 points. 
iii. If A and B both decide to defect, they each receive 250 points (because they claim the 
partner’s share but lose their own). 
5. Insurance: Players can insure against loss if a partner defects by purchasing insurance at a cost of 50 points. 
This makes the player whole for that round, less the cost of insurance. In example ii above, if A had bought 
insurance, A would have received 200 points for the round (250-50=200). 
6. Information: players will be provided recent history about the transactions potential partners have had. 
Every player with a contract or making an offer will have the cooperation decisions from the last five 
transactions shown. Players can purchase more history (in five transaction increments) for 10 points per 
purchase. Each purchase is history about one player only. 
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